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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of unmanned aerial system (UAS) capabilities in the commercial 
sector is posing potentially significant threats to the traditional perimeter defense of 
civilian and military facilities. In particular, commercial-off-the-shelf UASs, which are 
small, cheap, and come with many functions, have sparked growing interest among 
hobbyists and raised risks to facilities. Consequently, facility commanders now need a 
methodology to conduct quick evaluation and analysis of immediate threats to their 
facility to determine effectiveness of their facility’s counter unmanned aerial system 
(CUAS). Following a systems engineering approach, this research proposes a 
methodology that provides a step-by-step process to conduct evaluation and analysis of a 
facility, and employs model based systems engineering (MBSE) tools to assess a CUAS’s 
effectiveness and limitations. The methodology analyzes the CUAS’s operating 
environment and the ways CUASs may impact other stakeholders (e.g., adjacent 
allied forces, civilians, etc.) within the area of operation. We then identify 
configuration candidates for optimizing the CUAS’s performance to meet the 
requirements of the stakeholders. A case study of a hypothetical airport with an 
existing CUAS is presented to demonstrate the usability of the methodology, explore 
the candidates, and justify the implementation of a candidate that fits the facility’s and 
the stakeholders’ requirements. 
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Executive Summary
The continuous growth in Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) technological advancement and
adoption rates across industry and the hobbyist community pose significant security and
safety concerns to facilities such as airports, critical infrastructure, and military camps and
bases. Among such potential risks is an intruder UAS colliding with an asset, personnel,
or infrastructure that results in damage to aircraft or infrastructure, or injuries to personnel.
Additionally, recovery efforts at an airport, for instance, usually require the affected runway
to be temporarily shutdown or an aircraft pulled out of service which then can cause huge
interruptions to daily operations [1]. The consequences are potentially catastrophic for
facilities left unguarded against UAS threats. To keep pace with the rapid proliferation and
expansion of UAS capabilities, the defense industry must act quickly to implement updated
methods to safeguard critical infrastructures and operations against possible UAS intrusion.
Furthermore, the defense industry may find it challenging to keep up with emerging UAS
threats that make the design and implementation of a Counter Unmanned Aerial System
(CUAS) extremely complex.
This research employs a systems engineeringmethod and perspective to develop an approach
for the evaluation and analysis of a CUAS for a specific facility in order to better identify
the facility’s potential weak points and to balance the CUAS capabilities with adjacent
stakeholders’ needs. The proposedmethodology is iterative and allows designers to compare
performance parameters across the sub-systems of the CUAS and at different Technology
Readiness Levels (TRLs). The use of Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and
simulation tools aids in verification and validation of candidate CUAS configurations [2].
Candidate CUAS configurations are narrowed down to one design through the use of a Pugh
matrix. Then the down-selected CUAS is analyzed for effectiveness.
The method proposed in this research is as follows with additional sub-steps detailed in the
body of the thesis:
• Pre-Step: Collect System Information
• Step 1: Define Threats
• Step 2: Re-evaluate the Current System
xv
• Step 3: Perform Evaluation and Analysis
• Step 4: Generate Design Recommendations
This methodology serves as a guide for the designer to adopt an evaluation and analysis
approach in the design and implementation of a CUAS. A case study of a hypothetical
airport is also provided to demonstrate the methodology in reviewing and choosing a
candidate configuration that is resource-optimized and suits the facility’s needs in a timely
manner.
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In recent years, the rapid advancement of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) technologies
has sparked interest in and spurred the adoption of UASs for recreational uses by hobbyist
communities. Further, UASs have become affordable and accessible for every nation or
militant organization. While flying regulations are being implemented to require UAS
operators to provide attribution for all UASs in operation, many hobbyists still do not
provide such information, and nefarious actors can be expected to provide no identification
of UAS origin. Thus, merely requiring UAS identification is not sufficient to protect most
facilities, such as airports, from UAS intrusion. Further, if the facility were to be left
unguarded, the consequences of a UAS intrusion could be catastrophic. For example, if a
UAS were to be ingested into an aircraft engine during departure or to crash into a fuel tank,
such an event could cause loss of life, huge disruption to operations, and costly repairs to
infrastructure or assets.
UAS are designed to conduct various tasks that are “dull, dirty or dangerous” to hu-
mans [1]. The primary capability driver for UAS technological growth is the increasing
interest in military force preservation efforts while conducting dangerous tasks such as
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Humanitarian Assistance and Disas-
ter Relief (HADR), and precision strike. As UAS technology matured over the last several
decades, the commercial sector saw opportunities for UAS to be applied in commercial
operations such as infrastructure inspection, traffic surveillance, delivery, and meteorology.
Beneficial to both military and commercial sectors, the implementation of open architecture
in theUAS community has garnered significant innovationswhich continue to speed upUAS
technological advancementwith revolutionary potential. Commercial OffThe Shelf (COTS)
UAS or small group UAS often provide functions such as photography, videography and
self-assembly kits that attract hobbyists of all domains to adopt UAS for recreational pur-
poses [2]. Nonetheless, with the technological growth and widespread adoption of UAS,
there is a significant risk to the both military and commercial sectors [3], [4].
The key risks from non-nefarious UAS to facilities, bases, airports, critical infrastructure,
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and similar installations are loss of control and collisions. Loss of control may cause
major damage to critical assets or injury to humans, and may incur high costs to repair
infrastructure damage and heal severe injuries. For instance, a hobbyist UAS operator could
attempt to take videos of parked airliners as part of her hobby and inadvertently lose control
due to an out of signal range issue which could cause a collision with a departing airliner. As
the majority of UAS owners are hobbyists, many of them are untrained or inexperienced in
controlling an UAS. Existing regulation and policy are unable to track hobbyists’ operating
proficiency before allowing them to fly smaller UAS. Although there are no-fly zones around
sensitive areas, a handful of incidents still occur every year as hobbyists may not understand
the damage they could cause. Facilities such as airports, military camps and bases, and
government buildings and prisons are already experiencing the security dilemmas just
described in dealing with UAS [5]. Further, nefarious UAS activities pose an even greater
threat, although so far there have been relatively few such incidents globally outside of
active war zones.
Facilities have a compelling need to adopt Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUASs) to
proactively safeguard their assets and security. To effectively counter UAS, a CUAS require
multiple sensors to detect, identify, and classify the UAS before engaging an interceptor
to take down a UAS. There are multiple factors both internal and external to the CUAS
system, however, that can diminish the effectiveness of a CUAS and for which the facility
commander is required to adopt mitigation efforts against [6]–[8]. A big challenge facility
commanders face is to stay ahead of the technological race against UAS.
Existing research has primarily focused on the technical capabilities of CUAS and UAS
systems in isolation of a broader systems engineering perspective. The research in this thesis
adopts a systems engineering perspective to support facility commanders in understanding
a facility’s potential weak points against current and emerging UAS threats, and to balance
a CUAS capabilities against adjacent stakeholders’ needs [9]. The proposed methodology in
Chapter 2 allows the facility commander to explore the possible CUAS trade-space through
evaluation and analysis to ensure that the CUAS is optimized and relevant against the fast
emerging threat of UAS.
This thesis conforms to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “manuscript option” that
requires a manuscript be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal [10]. Chapter 2 of this thesis
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is currently in review with the Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute’s Systems
journal. Chapter 1 of this thesis has provided broader context for the work while Chapter 3
provides a summary of the work and recommends potential future directions for research
on this topic beyond what is found in Chapter 2.
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2.1 System Analysis of a Counter Unmanned Aerial Sys-
tems Kill Chain in an Operational Environment
A version of this chapter was submitted in August 2021 to the Multidisciplinary Digital
Publishing Institute’s Systems journal as: C.S. Tan, D.L. Van Bossuyt, and B. Hale, “System
Analysis of Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Kill Chain in an Operational Environment.”
MDPI is an open access publisher that distributes under the Creative Commons Attribution
License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited. Copyright does not apply in the United States
but may apply internationally.
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2.2 Introduction
The fast growth in commercial Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities poses signif-
icant threats related to safety, security, and privacy in perimeter defense [11]. The defense
industry sector has had to quickly implement methods to safeguard critical infrastructures
against UAS, both from adversaries and civilians. Many methods found to be effective in
dealing with UAS, however, can also cause disruption to other authorized operations, which
makes the operation of a Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) extremely complex.
For instance, an airport with an actively operating CUAS can disrupt communication signals
(e.g., mobile phones, control tower, etc.) and radar signals, which can limit ground crew
communications and disrupt control tower operation for critical coordinated activities such
as debris reports or runway clearance for landing or taking off [12]. Yet, the consequence
of not deploying CUAS can be catastrophic if a facility’s perimeter were breached by a
UAS. For instance, the UAS could collide with an airplane, causing a shutdown of the
runway. Moreover, a UAS used by someone with ill-intent, could conduct reconnaissance
and surveillance, conduct strikes on targets with weaponized UAS capabilities, or deliver a
payload that contains explosives or chemicals [13]. The situations just mentioned represent
only a few of the security dilemmas that facility commanders face today in dealing with
UAS.
Existing research and implementation of CUAS has focused largely on the technical capa-
bilities of CUAS and UAS systems such as detection, identification, and classification of
UAS, the study of CUAS kill chains with or without a human in the loop, and the limitations
of passive or active counter measures. Research has not focused on the broader systems
perspective. Although there is research on the adoption of UAS and CUAS in military and
perimeter security operations (e.g., airports, camps, and bases), only limited work examines
the full impacts on adjacent stakeholders and civilians within the perimeter vicinity during
the activation of CUAS interceptor systems in order to counter UAS threats or intrusions.
Developing a systems perspective on CUAS effectiveness in addressing current and emerg-
ing UAS threats may help facility commanders to better identify potential weak points
in their defenses. A systems perspective on mitigation measures to reduce the risk of a
successful UAS attack through a variety of means (e.g., new CUAS systems, progressive
levels of defense approaching sensitive assets, etc.) to counter UAS threats is also needed to
help facility commanders make decisions on potential CUAS upgrades. At the same time,
6
a systems perspective on how CUAS operations may affect adjacent stakeholders (e.g.,
allied forces operations and civilians) is needed to aid in balancing CUAS capabilities with
adjacent stakeholders’ needs.
2.2.1 Specific Contributions
This research presents a systems engineering evaluation and analysis process to review the
effectiveness of currently deployed CUAS in supporting facility operations. The proposed
process is intended for facility commanders to understandCUASvulnerabilities and consider
the possible effects their current CUAS may have on adjacent allied forces and civilians
(e.g., jamming, spoofing, etc.). A trade-off study can be completed through the proposed
evaluation and analysis method. This approach can then be used to develop an upgrade
or implementation plan to better defend facilities against the evolving UAS threat while
reducing impacts to adjacent stakeholders’ operations. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF),
Department of Defense (DOD), civilian airports, and other facilities that may be targets of
UAS can benefit from this research.
2.3 Background and Related Research
This section provides the required background knowledge and describes related research
on CUAS and UAS technical capabilities to assist in understanding the discussion and the
step-by-step process proposed in Section 2.4. Additionally, a review of the existing literature
on evaluation and analysis of CUAS is presented.
2.3.1 Specific Threats from UAS
The concept of the UAS was adopted by the military in 1849, when Austria used unmanned
balloons stuffed with explosives to attack Venice [14]. The unmanned balloons blew off
course, however, and were unable to reach their target. This failure motivated further UAS
technological development. Today, the U.S. military and many other defense forces have
successfully adoptedUAS to conduct operations such as precision strikes; electronic attacks;
and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). UAS have proven effective during
military operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom [15],
[16].
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Beyond the military, the commercial sector is investing in UAS development, as they
see potential economic growth from UAS deployment in the next few years ushering in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution [17], [18]. The rise in UAS-related patent submissions
over the last 30 years (from about 20 to about 12,000) demonstrates the explosive growth
in this sector, as shown in Figure 2.1, Developments over the last 30 years have included
sophisticated capabilities such as motion tracking, visual projection, thermal scanning, light
detection and ranging, 3D environment mapping, facial recognition, and obstacle avoidance.
UAS support many uses in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, logistics, security firms,
marketing, construction, and infrastructure. These capabilities have also attracted hobbyists
who have formed a community to adopt UAS for recreational uses [2] such as taking pictures
of scenery, videos, or racing. At the same time, unapproved media recordings may lead to
security concerns among respective stakeholders. Hence, the recent growth in both the
capabilities and the adoption rate of small Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) UAS poses
a significant threat to security facilities as well as civilian facilities [3], [4].




UAS are often classified by top speed, Max Gross Take-Off Weight (MGTOW), and maxi-
mum operating altitude. The groupings of UAS by basic capabilities and weight are given
in Table 2.1.
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UAS classification provides a quick guide to what a particular group of UAS can be
used for and the type of capabilities the UAS can employ. In this research, the UAS
capabilities of concern are payload-enabled capabilities, self-modification capabilities, and
swarm capabilities.
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Payload-Enabled Capabilities The MGTOW is the payload weight limit that the UAS can
carry, which narrows down the type of capabilities the UAS has. The most common low-cost
payloads are non-sensing payloads that do not gather or transmit any type of information
to the operator. Such payloads can be anything from homemade explosives to biological or
radiological payloads (e.g., Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives (CBRE)).
Delivery of such payloads requires the target to be in the operator’s line-of-sight. By contrast,
COTS payloads with capabilities such as live video feeds enable the conduct of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations and precision strikes. These capabilities,
however, are limited by the energy consumption of the UAS. Finally, a countermeasures
payload can disrupt a wide range of operations using Radio Frequency (RF) jamming or
electromagnetic systems. Like sensing payloads, countermeasures payloads are limited by
UAS energy consumption. A list of payload enabled capabilities is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Types of Payload-Enabled Capabilities
Type Capabilities
Non-Sensing Payload
Kamikaze Both the payload and UAS crashes into the target.
Payload Release The payload is carried to a certain altitude and is released
upon hovering above the target.
Sensing Payload
Electro-Optic The payload provides imagery and video recording functions
to support ISR operations.
Light Detection and Ranging
(LIDAR)
The pulsing of a laser for a given time that enables distance
measurements.
Countermeasure Payload
Spoofers The spoofing capability payload disrupts navigational or
command and control receiver systems, such as those that
rely on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).
Jammers The payload overloads sensor inputs which cause disruption
to operations.
Self-Modification Capabilities Another unique feature some COTS UAS have is that they
are packed in kit boxes and require self-assembly of premade components [20]. This feature
enables hobbyists with a certain level of knowledge in model aircraft and basic electrical
engineering, or with online learning resources to mix and match components to achieve
10
desired capabilities.
With the proliferation of low-cost materials and available design templates online, additive
manufacturing (3D printing) enables the creation of parts, which makes UAS design and
assembly customizable and enables rapid experimentation [21]. Such one-off designs are
harder to track by authorities as they lack a paper trail, which allows users with malicious
intent to adapt devices for nefarious purposes.
Swarm Capabilities As the complexity of military missions increase, the need to complete
more and complex high-risk tasks increases and drives the study of UAS deployment.Within
the defense community, on going research efforts focus on designing UAS to operate in
swarms, which can improve the efficiency of ISR, Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO),
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and Search And Rescue (SAR)
missions [22].
The commercial sector has found use for swarm technology as a means for entertainment at
large scale events. Commercial swarm technology can be seen in recent publicized events,
where a swarm of UASwas coordinated for lighting displays that switched between different
formations [23]–[26]. For instance, in China, swarm UAS were recently used for marketing
purposes in which QR codes were illuminated in the sky. Displaying QR codes can raise
several cyber-security concerns that are beyond the scope of this research [27], [28].
UAS swarm capabilities are achieved by adopting an automation architecture or utilizing
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to support UAS in basic self-
organized maneuvers and assist an individual operator in controlling multiple UASs for
a common mission. These decentralized and self-organized approaches are commonly
known as Swarm Intelligence (SI), which direct flocking, herding, and schooling that
resemble collective behavior found in animals. SI supports UAS in solving complex issues
through cooperation and operating within a set of rules embedded in the system [29].
History consistency of flocking coordination decisions may be assisted through application
of blockchain [30]–[33]. As operations are decentralized to swarm UASs, there is the
increased possibility of cyber-vulnerabilities.
Although there is the possibility of a UAS swarm intruding into a facility, the likelihood of
such an attack may be low, as the cost and space required to mount such a coordinated attack
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is most likely affordable only for a state actor or large organization with its own fleet of
UAS. This reduces the probability of a large-scale swarm UAS occurrence. Moreover, with
currently available CUAS, it is highly unlikely that the simultaneous launch of multiple
UASs would not be detected early, as the signature created at the launch site would be
significant. Nevertheless, the risk should not be completely ruled out, as the fast growth in
swarm technology could support future grey zone warfare in the event of rising tensions
between nations.
The direct threat of concern to many facilities is small COTS UAS (Group 1 and 2)
and modified UAS, which are inexpensive, easily acquired, and difficult to detect and
intercept [5]. As the adoption of UAS by the public has increased, there are increasing
reports of UAS intrusions and sightings that have disrupted facility operations and caused
monetary losses, flights delays, and unnecessary risks (e.g., the2018 Gatwick drone incident
and the 2019 Changi Airport drone incident [34], [35]). A 2018 study by the CUAS
capabilities analysis working group established the most probable nefarious uses of UAS
by non-state actors are for ISR, conveyance of contraband, kamikaze explosive attacks, and
CBRE attacks.
2.3.2 Counter Unmanned Aerial System
Currently, a wide range of CUAS solutions with various configurations can be purchased as
separate systems or suites of systems that can be adopted directly [36]–[38]. The concept
behind the proposed system solution composed of products from different companies is
similar – namely, the ability to detect and intercept UAS.
Several considerations influence the CUAS system configuration and performance such as
the level of facility security required, the expected time needed from initial detection UAS
intrusion until interdiction of the UAS occurs, and the type of deployed interceptor system
(e.g., kinetic, RF jamming, energy pulse, etc.). Given the need for flexibility in system
configurations, the cost of deploying CUAS is relatively high for a sophisticated solution.
As a complex system of systems, this solution requires detailed study of the environment in
which the CUAS operates (e.g., nearby tall buildings, terrain, weather, other environmental
behavior factors, etc.) to mitigate possible interference that may cause poor system perfor-
mance. A typical CUAS Operational Viewpoint - 1 (OV-1) is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2. OV-1 of Typical CUAS Operation
System Kill Chain
The CUAS kill chain model is similar to the generic military application of Find, Fix, Track,
Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA), and the definition of each process is given in Table 2.3.
With an understanding of the F2T2EA kill chain, we suggest that the CUAS kill chain
can then be simplified for the purposes of this research from F2T2EA to detection and
interception only.Detection consists of find, fix, track; and the remaining processes fall under
interception. This simplification helps in associating the kill chain process with physical
subsystem capabilities and key performance metrics that are discussed in Section 2.3.2 and
Section 2.4.
Subsystem Capabilities
The proposed CUAS requires three key subsystems to effectively counter incoming UAS.
13




Find Identify a target. Find a target within surveillance or recon-
naissance data or via intelligence means.
Fix Fix the target’s location. Obtain specific coordinates for the
target either from existing data or by collecting additional data.
Track Monitor the target’s movement. Keep track of the target until
either a decision is made not to engage the target or the target
is successfully engaged.
Target Select an appropriate weapon or asset to use on the target to
create desired effects. Apply command and control capabil-
ities to assess the value of the target and the availability of
appropriate weapons to engage it.
Engage Apply the weapon to the target.
Assess Evaluate effects of the attack, including any intelligence gath-
ered at the location.
The first subsystem is the sensor systemwhich performs the initial detection of the kill chain
process and conducts sensing only and investigates the cause of a potential UAS detection.
The sensor system consists of multiple sensors that can sense, maintain track, and identify
an incoming UAS. A list of typical CUAS sensors is given in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4. Sensor Systems.
Systems Capabilities
Radar Some UAS may be identified via radar signature. Radar may also be
applied to device tracking. Unlike RF, the radar signature of a UASmust




RF scanning supports the detection and geolocation of UAS based on
communication link frequencies. The UAS may also be identified by RF
behavior in some cases.





Identifies and tracks the UAS based on its visual signature.
Infrared
(IR)
IR uses heat signatures for identifying and tracking the UAS.
The second subsystem is the Command and Control (C2) system that performs the second
part of the detection kill chain process. The C2 system classifies and assesses the situation,
and subsequently provides decision-making assistance to the CUAS operator. TheC2 system
can fuse multiple sensors’ data, map the situation, confirm the threat, and provide decision-
making assistance and dissemination of information to the onsite response team. As there
are many different types of software that can be used to fulfill these requirements, this
research stays at a generic level with regards to software.
The third subsystem is the interceptor system, which performs the interception function
of the kill chain process. The interceptor system may consist of soft kill [40] and/or hard
kill [41]–[44] systems (see Table 2.5 for details) that can temporarily or permanently disable
or disrupt the UAS from continuing its mission.
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Table 2.5. Soft and Hard Kill Interceptor Capabilities.
Systems Capabilities
Soft Kill Interceptor
RF Jamming Radio frequencies are susceptible to frequency jamming, where RF
interference is generated to effectively block the RF connection between
the UAS and the operator or between more than oneUAS.
GNSS Jam-
ming
As with RF jamming, GNSS jamming blocks connection to the device.
In the case of GNSS, jamming is against the satellite link to the UAS, e.g.
GPS or GLONASS, which provides essential navigation information.
Spoofing Spoofing often implies a break in the cryptographic entity authentication
between the device and the operator/GNSS satellite. Spoofing an oper-
ator allows the attacker to impersonate the operator to the UAS, taking
control of the device or redirecting it. If spoofing the GNSS link, the
attacker may feed false navigation information to the device. Spoofing
may also be used by some researchers to imply a break in the channel
(data confidentiality or authenticity) providing information on the UAS
and operator link, or the GNSS link.
Dazzling High-intensity lasers or light beams can be used to render UAS camera
use ineffective.
Hard Kill Interceptor
Laser High-intensity lasers can be used for directed energy against a UAS,
melting or weakening key components.
Microwave Like lasers, directed high-intensity microwaves can be used to disable
the UAS’ electronic systems.
Nets Physical nets can entangle and trap a UAS.
Projectile Physical projectiles, including ammunition, can be used to kinetically
take down a UAS.
Collision UAS A custom UAS may be flown against the target UAS with the intent to
collide with it and produce a kinetic take-down.
Challenges
Although the CUAS may consist of multiple subsystems that have overlapping capabilities
in order to ensure a high level of success intercepting UASs, a number of external factors
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and challenges remain that are not within the controls of the system and can diminish overall
effectiveness in addressing a UAS intrusion.
The first challenge relates to the detection effectiveness of the sensors, which can be greatly
affected by some UAS capabilities [6]. For instance, a UAS with high maneuverability
enables close-to-the-ground and sea flying that can dampen a radar’s ability to detect the
UAS. Similarly, a UAS entering a facility from a direction with backlighting by strong light
sources such as the sun or from beyond tall buildings with a limited Line-Of-Sight (LOS)
will reduce the Electro Optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) sensors’ detection effectiveness.
Another factor is adverse weather, which can cause attenuation of RF signals and reduce
RF sensor effectiveness. Therefore, detection effectiveness is based on the specific ability
of each type of sensor to investigate intrusion throughout the environment and the available
LOS between the CUAS sensors and the UAS. In addition, the UAS MGTOW may also
contribute to detection interference, as it allows the UAS to carry payloads such as electro-
magnetic devices that can cause interference or damage to the sensors’ capabilities. In the
near future, it is likely that many operating environments will include the use of friendly
UAS within the area of operation [45]–[47]. Thus, there is a strong need to ensure that the
CUAS possesses the capabilities to identify, classify, and differentiate between friends and
foes in detected UASs to avoid missed or unintentional engagements. These limitations pose
a crucial requirement to have a sufficient buffer to compensate for errors during the short
and complex response window in which to deal with both authorized and unauthorized
UASs, as the effectiveness of the CUAS interceptor system can decrease rapidly as time
passes and an unauthorized UAS approaches an intended target.
The second challenge relates to the facility’s legal rights and public image when applying
passive or active countermeasures during a UAS intrusion [7]. There are rising concerns
about the application of CUAS interceptors in operating environments including the pos-
sibility of causing collateral damage such as a disrupted UAS falling out of the sky and
causing injury to bystanders and damage to infrastructure [5].Ongoing debates are already
focused on whether the application of an interceptor should be limited and used only as a
last resort, a prospect that would greatly reduce the effectiveness of a CUAS [7], [8].
The third challenge relates to the emerging requirement of forensic study of intercepted
UASs. Forensic study processes are known to be labor intensive and require much effort
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to find evidence of an operator’s intention through examination of media storage [48].
Nonetheless, the benefit of forensic study is high as it will assist in the vulnerability
assessment of a facility and in establishing improvement requirements for a CUAS. This
extracted data can include flight path coordinates, pictures, and videos that will provide
data to aid in the enhancement of base security such as extending fenceline boundaries,
increased foot patrol in an area, etc. [48]–[51]. With this in mind, it should be noted that
forensic study requires more resources and technical expertise among responding personnel
to prevent unintentional tampering with or destruction of evidence while extracting data
from the intercepted UAS’s media storage. The debate is, therefore, whether a dedicated
team of technical experts is required to conduct forensic study on detained UASs.
The last challenge concerns the consequences of engaging a misidentified target. There are
few studies on the consequences ofmisidentifiedUAS; however, multiple broadly publicized
incidents involving passenger aircraft being misidentified and subsequently shot down by
air defense systems due to mis-identification exist [52]–[55]. For instance, the incident
involving Flight PS752 which was shot down due to mis-identification by an air defense
unit in the suburbs of Tehran [55] provides an example of what a CUAS system could do
if it were to misidentify an incoming object. Per investigations into Flight PS752, the air
defense targeting system unit failed to re-calibrate and deemed that the aircraft was flying
toward Tehran at a low altitude. The defense unit operator attempted to inform the C2 center
of the suspected incoming threat, but the message was unable to be transmitted for unknown
reasons. The operator violated standard procedures by firing at the presumed hostile target
without receiving approval. With that in mind, the design of CUAS solutions should include
remediation to immediately hold or stop such an action and prevent a catastrophic outcome.
2.3.3 Existing Methods of Developing and Deploying a CUAS
Severalmethods exist to develop and deploy aCUASand related physical protection systems.
Such approaches include Garcia’s physical protection design and evaluation method, which
begins with the determination of the physical protection system objectives that characterize
the physical facility, define threats, and develop target identification. Next, the design of the
system splits into three broad categories of detection, delay, and response. The analysis is
then carried out on the system design to determine whether the system design has met the
requirements, and lastly, whether it is ready to be output as a final design or iterated back to
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the redesign loop.
A related method is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) risk man-
agement framework, which provides a generic process that can be applied to any type of
system [56]. The processes within this framework are prepare, categorize, select, imple-
ment, assess, authorize andmonitor. Each process must meet a certain objective that guides
an organization in adopting a more comprehensive risk management plan. The prepare step
identifies the key risk management roles and an established strategy that can be adopted
organization-wide. The categorize step ranks the risk according to the impact level and
appoints an appropriate approving authority. Then the selection of control measures to be
allocated to specific system components is made. The implement step applies the controls
for the system and the organization. The next step, assessment, assesses whether the controls
have met the intended outcome. The approving authority then reviews the assessment to see
whether the risk management plan is acceptable. The final step is the continuous monitoring
of the risk on the control implementation to allow timely review or intervention.
In general, the concepts and principles of the two methods just described are relevant and
applicable for adoption in conducting the analysis of a CUAS system. While they do not
directly address the need of a CUAS design method, these principles do provide inspiration
for this research.
2.4 Methodology
Rapidly developing UAS technology has disrupted the design and implementation of CUAS
systems. Consequently, scope creep and new requirements are often introduced late in
the CUAS system design cycle, which can lead to higher overall project cost or a failed
CUAS deployment. In order to successfully deliver CUAS solutions to facilities, it is
essential to develop a cost-effective and comprehensive system analysis method that can
ensure the designed CUAS stays relevant against emerging UAS technology and threats.
This section proposes a systems perspective analysis method that can guide a facility
commander in developing new CUAS capabilities and augmenting an existing CUAS. The
proposed methodology provides insights for how the CUAS system can be optimized to
achieve required system effectiveness and allow timely intervention to proposeCUAS system
redesign solutions. The proposed methodology illustrated in Figure 2.3 is not dependent on
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any specific CUAS technology and can be adopted by any facility to conduct analysis and
evaluation of potential and existing CUAS systems.
Figure 2.3. Overview of the Proposed Methodology. The methodology is in-
tended for use by facility commanders to analyze existing CUAS effectiveness,
identify CUAS capabilities gaps, produce CUAS upgrade recommendations,
and provide CUAS system design reviews.
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2.4.1 Pre-Step: Collect System Information
There are two events that can trigger the pre-step process. The first event is the identification
of emerging UAS capabilities that pose a new threat to the currently deployed CUAS at a
facility, creating a technological gap between the CUAS and the threat. It is assumed that
the pre-step has not been completed for the facility before and thus must now be done.
The second event is the availability of newly developed CUAS capabilities, and that can
address the existing outstanding CUAS threats a facility faces. These two events are iterated
upon throughout the design process and even after the system is delivered to ensure timely
intervention to maintain the intended CUAS requirements for the facility. Without either of
these events occurring, there is likely no need to use the proposed methodology.
The objective of the pre-step is to gather current and historical data about the CUAS.
The gathered data establishes the current state of the CUAS for further investigation and
analysis work by facility commanders. It is recommended to use Model Based Systems
Engineering (MBSE) tools such as Core, Innoslate, and others to assist in performing
analysis and evaluation work [57]. However, it is not mandatory and the analysis can still
be carried out without the use of MBSE tools.
Step 0.1: Establish Stakeholders’ Requirements
The initial data required from the stakeholders should detail the (1) daily activities within
the facility, (2) expected environmental conditions, and (3) facility security requirements.
The daily activities data can be human or asset (e.g., planes, cargo vessels, etc.) traffic
flow, routine operations, and possible ad-hoc operations that need to be carried out by
the respective stakeholders. This information can provide a baseline of the types of daily
activities that will be in operation alongside the CUAS at the facility.
Next, to understand the expected environmental conditions in which the system needs to
operate, it is important to gather facility blueprints, identify the maximum and minimum
boundaries of the facility (some facilities have zones of protection that extend beyond the
site boundary), conduct a direct LOS study, identify possible wildlife activity, and collect
historical weather condition data. This effort identifies the environment’s “noise” that could
interfere with CUAS system performance.
21
Finally, the stakeholders are to determine their expectations for the CUAS security require-
ments. This requires the stakeholders to list their critical assets with the expected level of
protection and security classification of the assets.
The objective in this step is to determine the expected CUAS operation conditions and
acceptable security level so that the system can be configured to meet all stakeholder
requirements.
Step 0.2: Review the Existing Risk Management Plan
In this step, it is important to understand the current risk management plan to determine and
address the inherent vulnerability of the existing CUAS. The inherent vulnerability can be
associated with any of these three areas: the first is physical system failures such as electrical
faults, inclement weather, fires, and accidents. The second is potential infrastructure damage
and injuries to personnel caused by falling intercepted UAS. The third type are the risks
posed by cyber security itself, which may have catastrophic outcomes such as if an attacker
successfully gains control of either the CUAS’s detection or interception systems.
The review of the existing risk management plan helps to determine whether there is any
impact on existing vulnerabilities introduced by a new CUAS design solution. Ideally,
a new CUAS design solution should cut down on the number of risks that the existing
risk management plan must address. Otherwise, there is a need to identify new mitigation
measures that may overlap with the existing risk management plan.
The objective in this step is to allow the facility commander to have a thorough and accurate
view of the impact of CUAS activities on daily operations. Thiswill be achieved by garnering
collective agreement from the various stakeholders about the mitigation plans that will be
in place to manage the identified inherent risks [58].
Step 0.3: Gather System Operator Feedback
The last step of the pre-step phase is to gather feedback from the personnel who interact with
the CUAS. To achieve high overall CUAS effectiveness, it is good practice to include current
operators or personnel who interact with the CUAS during design reviews, as these users
may uncover constraints or beneficial concepts that otherwise would not be recognized.
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These data can then support Human Factors Engineering (HFE) design efforts that improve
the interaction between the operator and the system [59]. This interaction improvement
implies a better response time and reduction in human errors, as the interaction is more
intuitive for the operator, which also increases the overall system effectiveness.
2.4.2 Step 1: Define Threats
In Step 1, the objective is to assemble current technical specifications of the Group 1 and
Group 2 UASs. A static list of technical specifications cannot be used because UAS de-
velopment is constantly advancing which translates into new capabilities frequently emerg-
ing [60].
Step 1.1: Establish New Threat Information
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the facility commander must understand UAS capabilities
that are of concern to the facility. Such concerns can be payload enabled capabilities,
self-modification capabilities, and swarm capabilities among others. For instance, if any
of the aforementioned capabilities have been made available to COTS UAS, the facility
commander should review the existing CUAS and determine whether the current CUAS
design solution is still relevant to manage the new threat. Hence, the facility commander
needs to collect both UAS and CUAS capability parameters to conduct the system analysis.
Step 1.2: Determine Potential CUAS System Vulnerabilities
To determine potential CUAS system vulnerabilities, it is essential to develop an under-
standing of baseline system performance. We recommend that the CUAS system’s baseline
performance be established through the listing of expected daily operations and be based
on possible UAS intrusion scenarios that may occur at the facility. Furthermore, potential
future scenarios should also be considered. The subsequent CUAS evaluation can then
harness the insights on vulnerabilities of the CUAS.
Given the identified vulnerabilities and data developed in the previous steps, it is now
possible to provide tangible measurements of the CUAS’s effectiveness. To this end, we
derive a generic mathematical representation of the probability of CUAS effectiveness from
Kouhestani [61]. CUAS effectiveness can be determined by Equation 2.1, which is the
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product of probability of detection and probability of interception. The breakdown of the
two sub-functions’ equations is explained in subsequent sections.
%( 5 5 42C8{4=4BB) = %(4C42C8>=) × %(=C4A24?C8>=) (2.1)
The probability of detection functions refers to the probability of the sensor detecting the
presence of a UAS. This includes the element of accurate identification and classification
of the UAS, which can also be implied as the false alarm rate. The three sub-performance
metrics of detection effectiveness in terms of probability are; sensing, tracking, and data
transmission. The relationship between each of the sub-performance metrics and their
definitions are given in Equation 2.2 and Table 2.6, respectively.
%(4C42C8>=) = %((4=B4) × %()A02:) × %()A0=B<8BB8>=) (2.2)
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The probability of the sensors being able to detect the
presence of UAS and initiate an alarm. A higher proba-




The probability of accurately tracking the UAS’s geolo-
cation. A lower rate of drops in tracking increases the
CUAS’s accuracy in acquiring the UAS’s position.
Probability of
Transmission
The probability of data being transferred over a specific
period such data might include UAS models and coordi-
nates that will be successfully transmitted to the response
team or interceptor. If the analysis is to omit or have
a perfect transmission rate, the value of probability of
transmission is kept as 1.
The probability of interception refers to the likelihood that the CUAS system can deny or
disable a UAS from continuing its intended mission. The sub-performance metrics that
make up the interception effectiveness in terms of probability are; hit, kill/deny, and risk.
The relationship between each sub-performance metric and their definitions are given in
Equation 2.3 and Table 2.7, respectively.
%(8=C4A24?C8>=) = %(8C) × %( 8;;/4=~) × %('8B:) (2.3)
25





Probability of Hit The probability of successful contact being made by the
interceptor to the UAS by either hard (e.g., projectiles) or
soft (e.g., electromagnetic waves) kill method. A higher
probability correlates with better effectiveness.
Probability of
Kill/Deny
The probability of successful denial or destruction of the
UAS after being contacted by the interceptor. A higher
probability correlates with better effectiveness.
Probability of
Risk
The probability of possible injury to a person or damage
to infrastructure due to a UAS falling or accidentally
colliding with an obstacle following interceptor action.
Based on a study conducted by [5], the probability that
a Group 1 or Group 2 UAS can cause that impact is
about 2-6% and it can remain in this state throughout the
evaluation.
In addition to the aforementioned mathematical relationship, it is also important to consider
any of the existing mitigation measures that will be applied to reduce collateral damage.
These mitigation measures are then evaluated as part of system vulnerability reduction in a
subsequent step.
Step 1.3: Define the Threat
With the vulnerabilities identified, the facility commander should next associate specific
threats with specific risk levels and then link the risk levels to respective system vulnera-
bilities. A threat can be defined by measuring the severity of the threat and how this could
cause the associated system vulnerability.
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2.4.3 Step 2: Re-evaluate the Current System
In Step 1, the process focused on the CUAS’s technical performance. In Step 2, the process
focuses on human factors that may affect CUAS performance from the perspectives of
adaptability and usability. The aim is to optimize and choose only changes that reduce the
CUAS’s impact on the people and operations within the facility.
To better understand the current system, more data such as building blueprints, existing
surveillance systems, perimeter environmental behavior, and standard operating procedure
documents are reviewed in detail. These documents should provide a good starting point
for a systems perspective of the overall effectiveness of the current CUAS that the facility
commander can use for analysis.
Step 2.1: Re-evaluate Facility Security Requirements with Stakeholders
With an understanding of current CUAS system capabilities in mind, it is important to
conduct a meeting with the respective stakeholders to verify whether the current CUAS
performance meets facility requirements. This includes the identification of the respective
stakeholders’ critical assets and critical asset locations within the facility, which will de-
termine the level of protection within that zone. This requirement provides the criteria for
the baseline of needed CUAS performance. The stakeholders must collectively agree and
commit to the operational requirements and safety constraints identified in this and previous
steps. If there is dispute over requirements, the facility commander will decide and direct
the stakeholders to accept compromises between their operation and security needs.
Step 2.2: Develop the Operational Concept View
At this point, a variety of OV-1s and accompanying system architectural products should
be developed to demonstrate multiple potential CUAS system configurations. These CUAS
configurations will be used in subsequent steps for comparison against requirements and
eventually determine that the current CUAS is sufficient or that the CUAS should be either
upgraded or replaced.
We suggest that it is particularly important to develop the OV-1 view because it allows the
facility commander and stakeholders to have a visualization of theCUAS systemperspective.
This helps to clarify interactions or identify missing interactions between portions of the
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base and its surrounding community and the CUAS. The case study in a subsequent section
provides an example of OV-1.
Step 2.3: Analyze Candidate CUAS Configurations
Now that several CUAS configuration candidates have been developed, a trade-off analysis
of requirements can be conducted.We recommend the PughMatrix approach because it pro-
vides a method for scoring in terms of positive or negative impacts on specific requirements
based on the facility commander’s best intuition according to the available data [62].
The Pugh Matrix analysis results can identify which CUAS configurations are the most
preferred. The CUAS configurations are ranked based on the stakeholders’ requirements
and translated into a decision to improve an existing CUAS (or build a new CUAS if none
already exists) or to remain with the existing CUAS.
If the prospective’ CUAS configuration solution’s benefit is lower or matches the current
CUAS, the recommendation is that no change to the current CUAS be undertaken. In this
case, return to Step 1 for continued monitoring of the situation for future emerging UAS
threats. Otherwise, if there are technological gaps found in the capabilities of the existing
CUAS against a UAS, proceed to Step 3.
2.4.4 Step 3: Perform Evaluation and Analysis
In Step 3, a more in-depth evaluation and analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness
of the proposed CUAS solution from Step 2.3. This step includes generating the workflow
of the proposed solution and using MBSE software to conduct simulation work.
Step 3.1: Simulate the Proposed CUAS Configuration
In this step, MBSE software is used to conduct detailed evaluations of the proposed CUAS
configuration. In the case study presented in this research, CORE software is used to conduct
the simulation of the CUAS’s functions which allows the facility commander to assess the
feasibility of the function’s interactions. That said, many other MBSE software packages
are available and have similar functionality.
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Step 3.2: Determine Dominant Factors
The objective in this step is to identify the dominant factors that have the most impact on
overall CUAS performance by simulating the down-selected CUAS configuration identified
in Step 3.1. This approach reduces the cost and time required to assess the new CUAS
configuration that may not otherwise have sufficient real-world data points for detailed anal-
ysis. Another benefit of conducting simulations is that they can explore high risk scenarios
involving personnel, hazardous payloads, and other threats which would be dangerous to
conduct physically. We suggest conducting a Design of Experiment (DOE) as part of this
step using software such as Minitab, ExtendSim, or CORE to generate time-based simu-
lations. Doing so can produce results such as outcome probability distributions, identify
delays and bottlenecks in the CUAS response, and implement probabilistic decision making
that can improve realism in the simulations [3], [63].
The interaction between the UAS and CUAS capabilities generates certain important inter-
action effects; the relationship of those interaction effects is illustrated in Table 2.8.
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UAS Maximum Range Detection Range To make earlier detec-
tion possible, the detec-
tion coverage should in-
clude the UAS maxi-
mum distance outwards
starting from the facil-
ity’s outer perimeter.
UAS Maximum Speed Response Time Required to inter-





Reaction Time This duration must be
much shorter andwithin
the response time. This
could also be used to
determine whether this
process should be man-
aged by human-in-the-






This will determine the
CUAS’s ability to deal





It will be ideal for the
interceptor to be able to
engage as soon as pos-
sible.
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Step 3.3: Identify Risks to the CUAS
In this step, risks to the CUAS are identified to allow formitigation strategies to be developed
in the subsequent step. In this context, we are interested in risk of the CUAS not performing
as intended.
CUAS system risks can be caused by limitations that are inherent to some CUAS subsystems
such as sensors and interceptors requiring LOS with the UAS, no sun glare, and other
related interferences. The CUAS is designed as a system of systems which aims to address
the individual sensor’s and interceptor’s vulnerabilities and eliminate such single points of
failure. Additional risks may be present such as bypassing (e.g., through blind spots, via
saturating or overloading a sensor, etc.) or spoofing sensors. Interceptors can be vulnerable
if they are unable to activate in a timely manner which can lead to missed UAS engagement
opportunities. Additionally, the risks to facility personnel and nearby communities caused
by the CUAS must be considered. For example, an adversary’s UAS that loses control due
to CUAS interception may fall or crash into nearby communities.
We suggest identifying and categorizing the risk level of the aforementioned risks into high,
moderate and low risk categories based on the severity of each risk outcome. We define
high risk as the possibility to cause significant damage to the CUAS or severe degradation
of its performance, to the facility, and/or to the surrounding community; moderate risk has
the possibility to cause moderate damage to the CUAS or degradation of its performance,
to the facility, and/or to the surrounding community; and low risk as the potential to cause
minor damage to the CUAS or degradation in its performance, to the facility, and/or to the
surrounding community.
Step 3.4: Develop Risk Mitigation Action Plans
Next, mitigation plans for each identified risk can be developed.
The aims of the mitigation plans are to increase the probability of CUAS success and reduce
potential collateral damage. We suggest that this can be achieved through a review of policy,
practices, and procedures associated with the CUAS. In order to reduce the likelihood of
CUAS system failure, the emphasis here is to develop and implement controls over the risks.
This can be done by strengthening the identified weak points of the system or by accepting
the risk and creating layers of processes to neutralize it if the CUAS system cannot be
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strengthened. While a variety of mitigation strategies are discussed subsequently, we assert
that the main consideration for risk mitigation should be to provide ample time for the
CUAS system to react safely to UAS intrusion while ensuring the safety of people operating
within the vicinity. We assert that this is a conservative and safer approach than others.
The first mitigation strategy is to achieve early detection so as to increase the duration of the
CUAS engagement window. Detection coverage should be as far out as can be reasonably
accommodated from the facility. The probability of successful detection can be further
increased by eliminating detection blind spots and reducing false alarm rates. If there is
LOS blockage by tall buildings or trees, this can be mitigated by employing patrols to
cover blind spots, pruning vegetation, or establishing satellite sensor locations atop the
tall buildings that otherwise would block CUAS sensors. This also involves adding layers
of procedures and a revamp of policy to allow installation of sensors on buildings that
may not be controlled by the facility. To reduce the false alarm rate, we recommend the
mitigation efforts include employing environmental studies, as discussed in previous steps,
to understand the visibility conditions at different periods of the day, such as possible sun
glare during sunrise and sunset, reduced visibility during inclement weather, and blockages
by wildlife activities.
The second mitigation strategy is to have interceptors that are effective and will not cause
disruption to facility operations or neighboring communities. The time taken to react and
neutralize a UAS intrusion is expected to be swift, and the result is expected to be decisive.
This mitigation strategy aims to intercept the UAS before it enters the facility or at least
prior to encountering sensitive areas of the facility. We suggest employing multiple layers of
interceptors to allowCUAS engagement at different distances andwith different interception
methods in order to eliminate the possibility of a single point of failure.
2.4.5 Step 4: Generate Design Recommendations
In the final step, the stakeholders collectively decide onCUASupgrades and implementation.
Step 4.1: Verify the TRL Level
In this step, checks must be performed to ensure that selected CUAS technologies and
configurations meet appropriate Technology Readiness Level (TRL) levels. We advocate
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using Kouhestani’s CUAS TRL levels where Level 1 is scenario-based testing (e.g., “red-
teaming” [64]–[66]), Level 2 is exploratory testing, Level 3 is baseline characterization
testing, Level 4 is performance testing (statistical confidence levels), Level 5 is degrada-
tion/vulnerability testing, and Post-Install is certification and periodic performance testing
[61]. Note that Kouhestani’s TRL is significantly different than other TRLs. We prefer
Kouhestani’s TRL levels over other approaches to TRL because it focuses on elements that
are more relevant to the rapid development of technologies associated with CUAS and UAS.
For the purposes of this research, we suggest that TRL Level 1 is the minimum level that any
specific system or subsystemmust be at within the CUAS for consideration. We recommend
not evaluating TRL earlier in the methodology beyond ensuring that CUAS technologies
are on track to be at TRL Level 1 by the time Step 4 is reached. This is because of the rapid
development of CUAS technology, which must keep pace with the rapid development of
UAS technology. If a facility was constrained to evaluate only TRL Level 5, then in our
opinion, the facility would have little hope of ever countering the latest UAS threats and
instead would be protected only against old and outmoded UAS threats.
After confirming the TRL levels, the results can be bundled into a package for stakeholder
review.
Step 4.2: Implement Recommended CUAS Design
In this step, the stakeholders review all CUAS information compiled and developed over the
previous steps. Stakeholders review the CUAS information to ensure that all requirements
are met satisfactorily. If that any requirements are not met, the stakeholders must either
accept that some requirements will not be met or the CUAS design needs to be revised to
meet requirements. If the CUAS does not meet requirements, the method returns to Step 2
and repeats until a suitable design solution is found or the stakeholders accept the CUAS
limitations.
If the CUASmeets all requirements, the facility commander can proceed with implementing
CUAScapability upgrades or deploying an entirely newCUASdepending upon the situation.
In parallel, the method returns to Step 2 to continuously monitor emerging UAS and CUAS
technologies and capabilities that can pose threats to and create solutions for the facility.




This section demonstrates the usability of the proposed methodology applied to a hypothet-
ical airport and CUAS in a dense urban area within a tropical environment. Although the
case study’s hypothetical airport and environment may bear a passing resemblance to some
airports, the details have been intentionally changed to retain realism while ensuring that no
unintended disclosure of sensitive information could occur because of this paper. The case
study assumes that a CUAS is already in operation and the expected threat is from hobby
UASs consisting of COTS systems. The analysis provides evidence to determine whether
emerging UAS capabilities require an upgrade to the existing CUAS’s capabilities. In this
case study we use the MBSE software CORE to illustrate the proposed methodology.
2.5.1 Pre-Step: Collect System Information
Step 0.1: Establish Stakeholders’ Requirements
The identified key stakeholders are the facility commander, personnel working within the
facility, and the CUAS operator. In a real facility, there could be multiple entities for
personnel working within the facility, and ideally, they would be listed separately as they
may have different levels of authority over the design solution.
The list of key stakeholders, their respective concerns, and their influence over the system
design is illustrated in Table 2.9.
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Facility Commander High System Cost
Delivery Schedule




CUAS Operator Medium System Usability
System Interface
Efficiency of the System
Safety
Legalization



















Alongwith the list highlighting the stakeholders’ concerns, the list of daily activities provides
a sense of the baseline operations within the vicinity. A sample list of daily activities is
provided in Table 2.10.







500 Estimated 200 flights per month (Based
on Changi Airport Group’s Data [68])
Luggage Trans-
portation
6 Estimated handling 200 flights per month
Runway Clear-
ance




3 Twice a month
The next step is to gather expected environmental conditions using historical data of the
weather over the past several years. The average year round weather historical data can
be accessed from Weather Spark’s website [69] and many other data repositories. The
parameters of interest to the designer are the temperature and weather conditions. These
parameters determine the expected operating temperature range that the CUAS is required
to withstand and the expected inclement weather such as haze, snow, and rain which will
affect the sensors’ sensitivity and visibility. The temperature in Singapore throughout the
year is estimated to be above 24◦C at the lowest and below 33◦C at the highest. For the daily
chance of precipitation, the lowest probability is 25% in February and the highest is 65%
in November.
Lastly, the stakeholders are to determine the boundaries of their respective assets and the
level of security required to guard their assets. The assets identified in this case study are
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the aircraft, the “critical repelling zone” where the airplane parks, and the runway where
airplane takeoffs and landings occur.
Step 0.2: Review the Existing Risk Management Plan
The existing risk management plan adopted the “isolation approach” for the physical system
and operating procedure to segregate the potential risks into layers for better management.
The physical system of the CUAS, like many other military systems, must have the redun-
dancy to ensure the mission can still be carried out. The existing risk management plan is
illustrated in Table 2.11.
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Table 2.11. Risk Type, Mitigation Action, and Simulation Model Approach.




Activation of soldiers to be deployed
as sentry until the CUAS is back on-
line
Increase processing
time and reduce the





Use of stand-alone portable aero-
scope to manage the detection until






Adoption of Physical Interceptor
gun by the patrol until system is back
online
Reduce the layer de-




1) Segregation of engagement area
into Outer, Inner, and Last Mile lay-
ers. Based on personnel concentra-
tion, Outer Layerwith lesser person-
nel will be given the highest priority
to engage theUAS followed by Inner




2) Interception after dispersal of per-




1) Isolation of communication link
and network
Unable tomodel in Sim-
ulation
2) Separation of super user account
from operator account
Unable tomodel in Sim-
ulation
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Step 0.3: Gather System Operator Feedback
The current CUAS is operating in human delegated mode where the system gathers and
generates a situation map that displays all the relevant information to the operator. The
system’s decision making tools will analyze the information from the sensors and provide
decisions of the pre-programmed actions to the operator. Nonetheless, the operator is still
responsible for interpreting the data and deciding which action to execute [70].
The primarily use of this HFE feedback is to ensure the virtual environment (Situational
Map) generated by the CUAS matches the actual environment as much as possible so as
not to cause any misjudgment in operator communication or decision making [71]. Other
factors to be considered for the design review include the sound level of the alarm, and
the Heads-Up Display (HUD), such as color of the threat, size of the text, legends to label
the icons, and confirmation messages. Other factors can be subjective and may vary with
different individual inputs. The best way is to use common colors for the display, such as
red for threat, blue for own forces, and so forth [72].
2.5.2 Step 1: Define Threats
Step 1.1: Establish New Threat Information
As the anticipated intrusion will be hobby UASs which are COTS and modified systems,
their specifications are mostly within the maximum endurance of one hour, the payload of
5 to 15kg, a maximum speed of 68km/h, and have a size of approximately 50cm to 2m in
width, with the ability to withstand strong wind speeds of 39 to 61 km/h [19], [73]. The
technologies found on the COTS UAS are usually electric propulsion, Vertical Take-Off
and Landing (VTOL), and a navigation system, all of which are radio-controlled but require
LOS to maintain the link. Although the specifications just mentioned may not be applicable
to a modified UAS, for now it can be safely assumed that the differences are minimal.
These capabilities are then recorded and set as the new baseline threat capabilities. Further,
the presented COTS UAS generally have the option to be configured into a swarm.
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Step 1.2: Determine Potential CUAS System Vulnerabilities
The overall potential system vulnerabilities are investigated and segregated into two parts,
which are the detection system and interception system.
The detection system vulnerabilities are defined by their sub-system weaknesses. However,
each sub-system, given its unique capabilities, addresses the weaknesses of the others, as
shown in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12. List of Detection Sub-System Strengths and Weaknesses.
Capability Strength Weakness




Long Detection Range can
identify specific protocols and
intercept video
Potential Latency and subject
to signal interference that can
cause false alarms
Radar Long Detection Range and
multiple target tracking with
no latency




Easy to investigate for human
decision-making
Required to couple with an-
other technology for better re-
liability
Understanding the detection sub-system strengths and weaknesses, in this analysis, it is
assumed that the system has a land link and it is frequently maintained. Therefore, for
the purposes of this case study, the probability of transmission can be considered 100%
successful. As for the parameters such as probability of sensing and tracking, they can be
gathered through the review of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) data or individual
conduct of conditional testing. In this case, with the assumption that the probability of
sensing and tracking are at 75% and 90% respectively, the overall probability of detection
can be determined using Equation 2.2, resulting in an efficiency of 67.5%.
Next, the interception system vulnerabilities are dependent on the composite parameters of
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individual probability of hit, kill/deny, and risk. For the case study, we adopt commonly
used countermeasures, including RF Jamming and GNSS Jamming, as they have the least
negative collateral impact and work against most current COTS UAS. On the other hand,
theymay have issues dealingwith amodifiedUAS operating in a unknownRF band or a with
modified navigation system such as an EO payload that utilizes a live feed for maneuvers.
In this case, with the assumption that the composite parameters of the probability for
hit, kill/deny, and risk are at 80%, 85%, and 6% respectively, the overall probability of
interception effectiveness can be determined using Equation 2.3, resulting in 63.9%. Note
that the probability of risk is inverted to get the non-risk probability for the calculation of
interception efficiency.
The overall CUAS effectiveness is then computed using Equation 2.1 and is 43.13% which
may not meet stakeholders’ requirements.
Step 1.3: Define the Threat
Based on the previous computation of CUAS effectiveness, there is a strong need to im-
prove both detection and interception effectiveness in order to raise the CUAS’s overall
effectiveness against the UAS. With the assumption that the adversary UAS’s objective is
to complete a path to a target with the least chance of being detected or intercepted, the
biggest threat that the CUAS will face is UAS speed, where the UAS’s speed reduces the
engagement window, which can be implied as a lack of time for the CUAS to process and
intercept.
2.5.3 Step 2: Re-evaluate the Current System
Step 2.1: Re-evaluate Facility Security Requirements with Stakeholders
With the threat defined, the stakeholders now need to decide what type of security is needed
to protect their assets. The first is to determine the maximum line of exploitation within
the facility that allows the UAS to roam freely after it intrudes the facility. Anything after
the maximum line of exploitation will be deemed the danger zone. With these boundaries
mapped out, the stakeholders need to identify locations for the detection or interception
system to be deployed, keeping in mind that the system deployed must be compatible
with the existing facility operations and procedures. Lastly, the stakeholders are to review
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the procedure of activating the response team and where the response team stands during
the CUAS’s down-time to consider the changes needed to support the system mitigation
measures. These details include the response team’s expected time to be ready, the rest area,
the mobility means, issued equipment, and the rules of engagement.
The outcome of the discussion is stakeholders accepting and approving the security level that
was presented in the proposed CUASs to kick start the candidate system exploration with
an in-depth study. This includes clarification of possible interference to the stakeholders’
operations that the candidate systems may cause.
Step 2.2: Develop the Operational Concept View
A graphical operational concept view of the hypothetical airport is shown in Figure 2.4. The
hypothetical airport is a relatively flat area consisting of three runways and generally low
buildings, except of one significantly tall control tower. On a daily basis, there will be some
ground operating crews onsite to direct aircraft traffic, transport luggage and clear debris
off the runway, and wildlife activity such as bird flocks around the trees and fence line. The
general assumption of the facility condition is that there are environmental effects which
may cause intermediate levels of interference. These conditions need to be accounted for in
the analysis as they may have some degrading effects on the subsystems’ performance.
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Figure 2.4. OV-1 – A Graphical View of Hypothetical Airport’s Operations.
Step 2.3: Analyze Candidate CUAS Configurations
The evaluation measures for the CUAS are based on the key design drivers described earlier.
There are numerous evaluation measures that can be adopted, but to have a reasonable
evaluation of the candidate configurations, four evaluation measures are created.
• High Detection Rate: The high detection rate will increase the success rate of the
mission. This measurement can be derived from the detection range, type of sensors
overlapping, and false alarm rate.
• Total SystemCost:The cost of the overall systemmust be prudent. Thismeasurement
can be derived from the per system cost, maintenance cost, testing cost, etc.
• Flexibility for Layer Deployment: The system must have the ability to deploy in
layers for in-depth defense.
• High Interception Rate: The high interception rate will increase the success of the
mission. This measurement can be derived from the probability of hit and kill.
The Pugh Matrix is an effective way to evaluate candidates as it allows the comparison
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of several design concepts against the existing system (Datum). This uses qualitative tech-
niques, and each criterion listed in Table 2.13 and Table 2.14 has a quantifiable comparison.






















Total SystemCost - - -




Sum of Positives 1 2 3




The Pugh Matrix may provide enough evidence for the designer to gather consensus from
the stakeholders to move forward to explore the candidate configuration more deeply.
The results illustrated in Table 2.13 suggest that the CUAS candidate that provides medium
detection range and a combination of soft and hard interceptors will be better as the sum
of positives score is the highest. With that, the designer can proceed to Section 2.5.4 for
further study of the CUAS candidate configuration.
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2.5.4 Step 3: Perform Evaluation and Analysis
Step 3.1: Simulate the Proposed CUAS Configuration
Conducting simulations can reduce project cost by exploring innovative ideas or feasibility
checks prior to actual live testing on the system. The feasibility check includes the testing
of system functions and their interaction through simulations, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.
This exploration can streamline the number of physical tests required and generally reduces
testing costs. The baseline simulation was conducted using CORE, and the result is shown
in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.5. Simulation of Proposed CUAS Function.
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Figure 2.6. The Enhanced Function Flow Block Diagram (EFFBD) of Pro-
posed CUAS.
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Based on Figure 2.5, it is feasible to implement the chosen candidate CUAS that consists
of a medium detection range and combination of soft and hard interceptors. The next
step is to determine the dominant factors to optimize the improvement design to meet the
requirements.
Step 3.2: Determine Dominant Factors
The results based on the DOE show the dominant factors that have significant impact to
the respective probabilities: The CUAS’s target initial range (maximum detection range)
exponentially increases the probability of kill as it increases; the target speed (the UAS’s
maximum speed) decreases the probability of kill significantly as it increases; and any of
the process, response, and neutralization times that require more than 10 seconds to carry
out will cause an exponential decline in the probability of kill. From the results presented,
the key dominant factors that have an impact on system effectiveness are the target initial
range (maximum detection range) and system response time.
Step 3.3: Identify Risks to the CUAS
With the dominant factors identified, the systemdesigner then creates a list of risks according
to their severity and the likelihood of occurrences that will affect them, as illustrated in Table
2.14.





Detection Blind Spot High High
Misidentification of Target High High
Wrongly Activation of Interception High High
Long Process Time High Moderate
Long Response Time High Moderate
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Step 3.4: Develop Risk Mitigation Action Plan
Next, the level of risk severity is addressed as it was identified as high risk through the
DOE. The mitigation actions’ aims are to reduce the likelihood of occurrences of the
possible identified risks. The list of mitigation recommendations and the new likelihood of
occurrences are shown in Table 2.15.
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Table 2.15. Mitigation Recommendations and Updated Likelihood of Occur-
rence.






Create different types of sensors
overlapping
High Moderate





Include human in the loop High Moderate






Issue confirmation prompt High Low




Use AI to assist High Low




Increase early detection range High Low
Practice response protocol periodi-
cally
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2.5.5 Step 4: Generate Design Recommendations
2.5.6 Step 4.1: Verify the TRL Level
Based on the findings inChapter 2.5.4, the proposed CUAS possesses feasible functionality
and meets most of the stakeholders’ requirements.
The following step is to apply the mitigation measures to address the identified risk. The
candidate design increases the CUAS’s detection distance and adopts a combination of soft
and hard interceptors which can effectively improve probability of sensing, probability of
hit, and probability of kill/deny, respectively. The results are illustrated Table 2.16.
Table 2.16. Expected Probability Improvement by the Proposed Design.






With the applied mitigation measures, the CUAS’s expected effectiveness increases from
43.13% to 77.19%. Based on the current sub-system’s TRL against the UAS’s TRL, this
percentage of efficiency is acceptable for implementation. Hence, the case study proceeds
to Section 2.5.6.
Step 4.2: Implement Recommended CUAS Design
To proceed with the recommendation, the stakeholders now make an informed decision to
accept the unaddressed requirements and agree to discuss those requirements in the future
when opportunities arise, and make necessary reviews of their Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (TTP) to ensure they will maintain system cohesiveness to support implemen-
tation efforts. This includes reassessment of project funding and reallocation of resources
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to support the new design configuration efforts.
While the implementation process is underway and after the new CUAS is deployed, the
facility commander continues tomonitor emergingUAS capabilities. As new threats emerge,
the process is repeated to respond in a timely manner to the new threats.
2.6 Discussion
With the anticipation of deploying UAS to support the facility’s daily operation, there is
some key insight that will be applicable in reviewing the design solution. Rapidly emerging
UAS capabilities are known to quickly reduce the effectiveness of a CUAS. Through minor
tweaks to the UAS, a UAS can avoid detection and interception by a CUAS. The proposed
methodology guides the designer through a structured systems engineering approach that
is repetitive and consistent and allows the designer to compare the performance parameters
across different sub-systems of the CUAS. The design principles are generic where peoples’
interactions with the system are explored and leverage the collaboration effort across the
stakeholders to ensure the chosen CUAS is effective.
The use of MBSE and simulation tools assist in the verification and validation of the system
to further explore innovative ideas and conduct a feasibility study in a cost-saving and safe
environment. Furthermore, the DOE can determine the dominant factors which then provide
better insight to improve the system in a resource-optimized approach.
Although the data about the CUAS and the environment used in the case study are intention-
ally fictitious, the proposedmethodology provides a generic guide to the facility commander
for understanding the critical requirements of a CUAS’s deployment through the proposed
systems engineering approach. The proposed methodology is specifically useful for resolv-
ing projects with design uncertainty due to unknown parameters and projects with limited
resources.
A word of caution, this methodology is proven effective in theory only. IT is not known
whether more complex issues will arise when the actual system data sets are presented. The
challenging portion of the methodology will be the development of a consistent parameter
for performance comparison. This challenge could be due to limited testing facilities or
because the capability is at low TRL. To overcome this, the data set must be generated
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through live testing of a wide variety of scenarios, but this will entail an increase in the
project’s overall budget. It is worth nothing, however, the method of acquiring realistic
and usable consistent parameters is not within the scope of this research. We assert that
different types of facilities, different countries, and different stakeholders will find different
parameters of most utility to their specific situations. Thus, we do not recommend a specific
performance parameter here.
The proposed methodology can address threats from a single UAS up to UAS with swarm
capabilities. The research did not include UAS capability that allows a UAS to travel through
air and underwater, which may have a huge impact on the detection capability of the CUAS,
as the UAS will be able to travel stealthily underwater and strike with agility in the air [74],
[75]. Although the re-evaluation of design principles will be similar, the need to include
underwater sensors such as sonar or proximity or new types of underwater countermeasures
will generate integration issues such as increased false alarm rate, incompatible output, and
target hand-over between ground sensors and underwater sensors.
The recommended expansion of this work is to include methods for generating consistent
parameters through the conduct of designing a live test to support the evaluation through
validation and also to conduct research on the new UASs that can travel both in the air
and underwater. The expansion of the study will support this analysis by providing realistic
results and include analysis of the emerging technology.
2.7 Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the case study demonstrate that the adoption of an iterative
learning and data sharing approach such as the methodology proposed in this study can
consistently ensure that the CUAS is reviewed in a timely manner. The battle against the
rapidly emerging capabilities of UASs that threaten the relevancy of deployed CUASs may
be a thing of the past by enabling modular upgrades to strengthen a CUAS’s systems and
test system performance even at low TRL, and reduces the possibility of a UAS exploiting




This chapter summarizes the research findings and highlights potential areas for future
work. The journal manuscript presented in Chapter 2 can be used to address challenges that
DOD, SAF, and civilian facility commanders face when conducting tests and evaluation of
existing and anticipated CUAS capabilities to counter a UAS threat.
3.1 Conclusions
It is essential to develop a resource-optimized evaluation and analysis methodology to
rapidly assess CUAS effectiveness through the assessment of the technological gaps between
existing CUASs and emerging UAS threats and capabilities. The traditional CUAS system
acquisition and development process may not suit efforts to counter the rapid growth in UAS
capabilities. The focus of the methodology proposed in this thesis is on iterative learning
and data sharing that supports the modular upgrade of an existing CUAS. The modular
approach allows performance testing of capabilities even at low TRL, which is beneficial
for generating data points and understanding the relationships of the dominant factors in
CUAS systems being effective against UAS threats. The timely review of a CUAS may then
reduce the possibility of UAS with the latest capabilities exploiting the inherent weaknesses
of a facility’s security, because such a review enables the application of mitigation measures
before such exploits happen. The methodology demonstrated in the case study provides a
process to gather data from both emerging UAS and CUAS systems to conduct evaluation
and analysis. While the data used in the case study are intentionally fictitious, the case study
does provide a good indication that the proposed methodology is valid and useful.
With the anticipation that in the future more industries will employ UASs to support their
daily operations and tasks, the increase in UAS activities around facilities will require
specific security and safety measures to reduce potential risks. The proposed methodology
provides some key insights that will be applicable in reviewing the a CUAS’s configuration
and focuses on two key functions: detection and interception. The design principles used
in the methodology are generic where it explores peoples’ interactions with the CUAS and
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leverages collaboration across the stakeholders to ensure the chosen CUAS configuration is
effective at meet emerging UAS threats. The proposed methodology is specifically useful
for resolving CUAS projects with design uncertainty due to unknown parameters, CUAS
projects that have limited resources, and the methodology can also address threats posed by
a single UAS as well as a UAS swarm.
3.2 Future Work
Adopting a systems engineering approach, the proposed methodology provides a guide to
facility commanders for understanding the critical requirements of a CUAS deployment.
It is important to note, however, that this methodology is proven effective in theory only,
via the case study. It is not known whether more complex issues may arise when real
system data sets are used. The most challenging portion of the methodology will be the
development of consistent parameters for performance comparison. This challenge could
be due to limited testing facilities or specific needed capabilities being at low TRL. To
overcome such challenges, data sets must be generated through live testing of a wide variety
of scenarios albeit with accompanying increases in overall project budget. Nevertheless,
acquiring consistent parameters and data sets that are realistic and usable is beyond the
scope of this research.
Recommended future expansions of this work include:
• Developing methods that produce useful data sets from live tests to support CUAS
evaluation through validation of said data sets
• Increasing the autonomy of CUAS operations
• Improving the CUAS’s cyber resilience
It may be tempting to introduce more higher quality sensors and interceptors to existing
CUAS but many existing CUAS configurations are currently sufficient and cost-effective
to deal with current UAS threats. Building from current CUAS configurations, a systems
engineer should explore how to increase the uses of autonomy to make quicker decisions
and further improve CUAS effectiveness. Understand that there will be uncertainty and
constant searching of use-cases to justify the need for CUAS autonomy, and there must be
the willingness to go through proper review and structured evaluation to reap more benefits
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from a less conservative approach in design [76]. On the other hand, increasing autonomy
in CUASs may increase inherent cyber security risks and requires in-depth analysis to
constantly improve cyber-resilience and evolve mitigation plans [77]. An exploration into
system “self-recovery” may be beneficial to support increased autonomy, as the reduction
of having a human in the loop may not allow timely response to the immediate cyber-threats
and implies that the system needs to have the means to automatically detect abnormalities
or anticipate cyber-threats and activate protocols such as an immediate reboot or change in
security pin [78], [79]. The suggested future work may support the proposed methodology
by providing realistic results and include building a future-proof system against potential
emerging technology. This may support the study of military and high-risk facilities (e.g.,
airports, oil plants, chemical plants and the like) with the focus of using parameters that
will minimize the cost required to conduct testing. The success of this methodology will
benefit DOD, SAF, and facility security in dealing with constantly evolving UAS threats.
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